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ENFORCEMENT OF COVENANTS-NOT-TO-COMEPETE
AGAINST PHYSICIANS: BUYING THE PRACTICE
AND EMPLOYING THE PHYSICIAN WHAT RULES APPLY?
DonaldA. Daugherty, Jr.-

INTRODUCTION

One of the more significant legal issues implicated by the rise of integrated
health care delivery systems relates to the use of covenants-not-tocompete. Because the value of a medical practice rests largely on the

intangible talents of its physicians, noncompete clauses are an essential
means of preserving the value of a medical practice as it transfers from

seller to buyer. However, since noncompete clauses also have the effect
of restraining a person from freely practicing her or her chosen trade,
courts generally disfavor covenants-not-to-compete.1 This is especially
true when the covenantor is a physician because of the potential the
covenant will interfere with patient relationships.

Nonetheless, most courts recognize and enforce covenants-not-tocompete in the context of the sale of a business (including a medical

practice), as well as in employment agreements (including physicians'
contracts). For the reasons discussed below, covenants included in
contracts for in the sale of a business are enforced more liberally than those

applying to an employment situation.
A recent problem regarding covenants, involves their use in a third
"hybrid" situation: where a medical

practice is sold and the selling

physician then becomes an employee of the buyer. Given the disfavor with
which courts view covenants-not-to-compete and the divergent treatment

*Assoate,Michael J. Best, Milwaukee, VI. B.A.,University of Virginia, 1985; J.D., Northiv ctem
University School of Law, 1985.
1 Under common law, all contracts in restraint of trade were void as against public p licy.
Today, the doctrine has been relaxed, and a distinction between general and partial restraints of trade
has been recognized by the courts. As discussed in greater detail in this article, while general restraints
on trade are still void, contracts which constitute a partial and reasonable restraint are valid where
supported by proper consideration. See Tarr v. Stearman, 264 M1.110 (1914); Pele v. Kulentis, 257
111.
App. 213 (1930); Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Sarfstein, 482 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1972); Field
Surgical Assocs.,Ltd. v. Shadab, 59 M1.App.3d 991 (1978); Field, Lawter Intern, Inc. v. Carroll, 116
Ill. App.3d 717(1983), Cockerill v. Wilson, 51 IlI.3d 179 (1972); Firsch Corp. v. Ezzel, 25 Ill. App2d
134 (1960); Mvatch Corp. Of America v. Acme Match Corp., 285 SE.2d 906 (W.Va. 19S2).
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of covenants in buy-sale and employment contexts, the question arises as
to how a covenant will be treated in the hybrid situation, and whether it
will receive the more liberal treatment, in particular, with regard to the
length of time that the restriction is in effect.
This article will explore the use of covenants-not-to-compete in the
"hybrid" situation, where a medical practice is sold by a physician and the
new buyer subsequently employs the seller-physician. Unforunately, there
are relatively few cases that address this situation because, until the recent
trend toward consolidation in the health care industry, a physician would
usually sell a practice only when he or she intended either to retire, leave
the geographic area, or otherwise not be in a position to compete with
the buyer. Additionally, in the past the buyers were typically other
physicians, as opposed to hospitals and other large health care entities who
are now purchasing physician practices. Nonetheless, upon review of both
cases involving other professions and businesses, as well as the few that
involve physicians, a general rule appears that suggests that in order to
receive more liberal treatment, a covenant must be an integral part of the
sale transaction and intended primarily to protect the purchase of goodwill
by the buyer. A significant factor is the extent of the covenantor's
bargaining power vis-a-vis the buyer-employer.
This article will also discuss the treatment by the courts of
noncompete covenants, including their restricted use in employment
contracts as well as their more liberal enforcement in the sale of a medical
practice.
Finally, this article will review the way covenants-not-to-compete
have been treated by the courts in a variety of these "hybrid" situations,
and will outline considerations and practical guidelines for parties involved
in such transactions.
GENERAL LAW REGARDING
COVENANTS-NOT-TO-COMPETE
At the heart of all enforceable covenants-not-to-compete is the principle
of avoiding unjust enrichment of the covenantor. 2 In the context of a
business sale, courts have reasoned that an individual should not be able to
2

See Reddy v. Community Health Found., 298 S.E.2d 906 (W.Va 1982).
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sell his or her business and reap its "going concern" value, then
subsequently start a new business to compete against, and thereby
jeopardize the value ot the just-sold enterprise?3 In the context of an
employment agreement, unless prohibited by state statute, courts allow
employers to restrain the activities of ex-employees to avoid any unfair
exploitation of trade secrets, customer lists, or other knowledge gained by
the covenantor during the course of employment. 4
Both in the buy-sell and employment contexts, the general rules
governing noncompete clauses are well established.5 To enforce a
covenant, the threshold requirement is that the covenantor receive some
consideration in exchange for agreeing to the restriction.6 If this threshold
is met, courts will evaluate the reasonableness of a covenant's terms by
examining the following factors: (i)
the needs of the covenant's beneficiary
(i.e., the buyer or employer); (ii)the covenant's duration, territorial extent,
purpose and scope; and (iii) the pulic interest.7
Noncompetition covenants arising out of the sale of a business are
typically enforced more liberally than those arising out of the employeremployee relationship.' The primary reason for this divergence is that the
courts consider an employee to be generally in a weaker bargaining
position at the time of contract formation as compared to a party selling his
or her business.9

' See generallyId. at 911-914.
4 For example, the antitrust statutes of California, Montana and North Dakota eo:pr_:Ify
prohibit certain contractual restraints upon the practice of a "profeusion," and have k:en held to
invalidate non-competition clauses in physician emp!oyment agreements,. Colorado and Ma:2zhu:t2t
statutorily prohibit non-competition covenants that restrict physicians from practicing mdicine
(although monetary damages for harm suffered by the employer as a re:ult of the phyzician's dcparture
are allowed). Similarly, a Delaar statute declares that covenantz-not-to-compcte v.hich are anffllary
to employment, as well as partnership or corporate agreements v,hich restrict the right of phy:icians
to practice medicine in specific locations for specific periods of time are void, although a covenantez
may recover damages for breach.
' Of course, the specifies vary from state to state. For e:cnmple, comejurizdictions hold that
two year restrictions in employment agreements are reasonable, while other states reeognizc
restrictions up to three years.
6 See also Basic Computer v. Scott, 791 F. Supp. 1280 (ND. Ohio 1991); Curtis 100O, Inc.
v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224 (ND. Iowa 1995).
' See also Basic Computer v. Scott, 791 F. Supp. 1280 (ND. Ohio 1991); Curtis 1000, Inc.
v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
8 Alexander & Alexander v. Danahy, 488 N.E2d 22 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
9 White v. Fletcherfqayo!Assocs., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 746, 74S (1983).
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A similar rationale has been relied on to justify the more liberal
enforcement of noncompetition clauses in partnership agreements, where
equal value is exchanged among the contracting parties since each partner
not only commits herself or himself to the restrictions, but derives a benefit
by exacting the same restrictions from every other partner." For example,
while the duration of a restrictive covenant in an employment agreement
is generally unenforceable beyond two or three years," restriction periods
of five or more years in covenants that are ancillary to the sale of a
business have been upheld. 2 This is especially significant as applied to the
types of transactions discussed here, because the longer the period of
restriction and the more secure the value of the acquired practice, the
greater is the disincentive for the seller-physician to leave. 3
Another example of the dissimilar treatment applied to covenants-notto-compete depending on whether they are included in a contract involving
the sale of a business, or an employment agreement, is the rule in certain
jurisdictions that does not allow covenants included in employment
contracts to be reformed by a court so as to render them enforceable.
Reform is, however, permitted for covenants encompassed in a contract
for the sale of a business.' 4 Other examples of this disparity include
Colorado and California statutes that both prohibit the use of noncompete
covenants for certain employees except in the sale of business context,1"
and the courts of Louisiana and Alabama which exempt restrictive
covenants contained in partnership agreements from statutes prohibiting
covenants in connection with employment agreements.' 6
One of the most instructive decisions of how the courts treat the issue
of non-compete covenants in the employment and sale of business context

Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Prof IAss'n, 437 S.E.2d 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
u Hammer Holding Group, Inc. v. Elmore, 613 N.E.2d 1190 (Ill. App. 1993).
12 Id., see, e.g., Sobers v. Shannon Optical Co., 473 A.2d 1035 (Pa. 19;34); Betten Co. v.
Brauman, 18 Wis. 203,208 (1935); HBG Corp. v. Houbolt, 367 N.E.2d 414,432 (N.C. App, Ct,
10

1977).
3 MedX, Inc. of Fla. v. Ranger, 780 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. La 1991); Reddy v. Community
Health Found., 298 S.E.2d 906 (W.Va. 1982).
14 See, e.g., White v. Fletcher/Mayo/Assocs., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 746, 749 (Ga. 1983).
15 CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE § 16600 (1995); 1982 Colo. Sess. Laws, c'h. 41 at 232.
16 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West 1995); ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1995); See McCray v.
Blackburn, 236 So. 2d 859 (La. 1970).
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is the non-physician case of White v.FletcherlMa,olAssociates, Inc."7 In
White, the plaintiff was the vice president and a 5 percent shareholder of
an advertising agency.18 When the agency was purchased by a company
who then became his employer, White sought a judicial declaration
voiding a noncompete covenant he had signed when first employed by the
agency. 9 While the purchasing company sought to have the covenant
construed as part of the sale of the business (in which transaction the
plaintiff had sold his stock), the plaintiff sought to have it construed as part
of his employment agreement.2"
In analyzing the controversy, the White court stated, "[i]t is
problematical whether his profit [on the sale of stock] constituted
consideration for his covenant-not-to-compete, or whether the sole
consideration flowing to [the plaintiff] in return for the covenant was his
continued employment.2 The court went on to hold that:
where a trial judge is asked to determine the enforceability of a
noncompetition covenant which the buyer of a business contends
was given ancillary to the covenantor's relinquishment of his
interest in the business to the buyer, and not given solely in return
for the covenantor's continued employment, the judge must
determine the covenantor's status. If it appears that his
bargainingcapacity was not significantly greaterthan that of
a mere employee, then the covenant should be treatedlike a
covenant ancillary to an employment agreement .... 22
(emphasis added).
In making this analysis, the White court found that White's bargaining
power was no more than that of an ordinary employee and, thus, treated
the noncompete clause as ancillary to White's employment contract.23

White, 303 S.E.2d at 749.
Id. at746.
19 Id. at747.
17
i'

"' White v. Fletcher)MayolAssocs., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 746,747 (Ga. 1983).
21 Id. at 750.
2
Id. at 751.
23

Id.
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COVENANTS-NOT-TO-COMPLETE: EMERGENCE
OF A HYBRID IN PHYSICIAN CASES
The rationale articulated in White v Fletcher/MayoAssociates, Inc.24 has
also been applied by the Georgia courts to cases involving the enforcement
of noncompete clauses against physicians, most notably in Pittman v.
2
Harbin Clinical Profession Assh'n
In Pittman, a group of five
neurologists and neurosurgeons sought a judicial declaration to render
unenforceable the covenants-not-to-compete in their employment contracts
with their former employer, a professional association clinic. 6 Two of the
plaintiff-physicians had been shareholders in the clinic, while the other
three physicians were strictly employees of the clinic and held no
ownership interest." The shareholder noncompete clauses prohibited the
practice of medicine within thirty miles of the clinic for one year after
leaving the clinic, but allowed the covenantor to buy out the restriction by
paying a specified amount to the clinic.2" The non-shareholder clauses
were identical, except that the restricted area encompassed a fifty mile
radius from the clinic, and required a lesser sum to buy out the covenant's
restrictions."
After examining the employment covenants, the Pittman court upheld
the enforceability of the noncompete clauses against the shareholders; but
the court found them unenforceable against the non shareholders.3" The
court found the terms of the covenants among the shareholders
reasonable. In addition, the court found that although the agreements
signed by the shareholders were denominated as "employment contracts,"
by executing the agreements, the shareholders not only agreed to restrict
themselves to the covenants' terms, but obtained promises to do the same
from the approximately thirty-five other physician-shareholders who
executed identical contracts.31 Thus, the court found the bargaining power

24

Id. at 746.

'

Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Prof'I Ass'n, 437 S.E.2d 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).

Id.
27 Id. at 621.
2 Id.
26

" Id. at 623.
31

Id. at 621-623.

31 Pittman v. Harbin Clinical Prof'l Ass'n, 437 S.E.2d 619, 621-623 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
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of the shareholder-plaintiffs was equal to that of those with whom they
contracted, and the agreements were more analogous to medical
partnership agreements than traditional employment contracts."2
With regard to the non shareholder employee physicians, the court
examined the covenant's prohibitions, which included forbidding the
physicians from practicing within fifty miles of the clinic. The court
detenined that although the fifty mile radius was not per se unreasonable,
because it was included only in the contracts of the non shareholder
physicians whose bargaining position was significantly less than that of the
clinic, stricter scrutiny of the covenant terms was required.33
Although the bargaining power factor set forth in Pittmanhas not yet
been expressly adopted or applied to enforcement of physician noncompete
clauses in other jurisdictions, several other courts have also considered the
treatment of noncompete clauses agreed to by physicians who have then
sold practices and become employees of the purchasing entity.3"
For example, in Boulder Medical Center v. Moore, the plaintiff
physician was part of a partnership which transferred its business to a
corporation and then dissolved itself, at which time the purchasing
corporation then employed the physician. 5 When the plaintiff chose to
leave the corporation one year after the transaction, the corporation sought
to enforce the covenant included in the physician's original employment
contract.' The Moore court enforced the covenant upon finding that the
physician not only owned an interest in the medical practice itself, but in
the original partnership that still owned the equipment used in the practice,
and in a corporation that owned the land upon which the clinic was
located.37 The court also examined the fact that upon the physician's
M at621-622.
33 Id.
32

' See, e.g., Isuani, LD. v. Manskt-Sheffeld Radiology Group, 793 SAT2d 346 (Tc'. Ct
App. 1990) (discussing the radiology partnership w.hich brought suit sei-ing to enforce noncamp-e!z
agreement against one of its partners); Irewett Orthopaedic Clinic, PA v. George I.I. White, MD, 629
So2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1993); Rajiv Chandra, M.D., v. Gopal D-dcfi., U.D , 610 So2d 15

(Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1992) (discussing a doctor and medical group which brought action cEzing, intr
alia,preliminary injunctian to enforce noncompetition agreements contained in ceparated emp!o)ment
contracts with physicians).

Boulder Medical Ctr. v. Moore, 651 P.2d 464,465 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (predating state
statute voiding injunctive relief under noneompete clauses in physician employment agreemnLt).
36 Id.
37 Id.

JOURNYAL OFHEAL TH CARE LA

100

V 1-93
[Vol.

departure, he was entitled to payment for his interests from all three
entities, a circumstance which undermined the physician's assertion that he
had not sold his business when he left.38 Therefore, the Moore court held
the covenant, which prohibited the physician from practicing medicine in
Boulder County for five years ater his departure, was enforceable since it
fell within the sale ofbusiness exception to the state statute voiding certain
covenants-not-to-compete.39
Similarly, in CardiologyAssocs. of SouthwesternMichigan,P.C. v.
Zencka, a group of cardiologists sought to enforce a noncompete covenant
against the defendant cardiologist who was a shareholder in the plaintiffprofessional corporation. The defendant had signed both an employment
contract and a stock redemption agreement that included the covenant.
The latter agreement was required under the stock ownership provision of
the employment agreement.4" Both agreements were executed by the
defendant-cardiologist when he became a shareholder in the plaintiffprofessional corporation.4
In Zencka, the court focused on the nature of the signed agreements
and concluded that they constituted an employment contract with the sale
of stock incident to the employment, rather than a sale of an interest in the
cardiology practice with employment incident to the sale.4 The Zencka
court looked to the first employment contract signed by the defendant,
requiring that if the defendant were to continue his employment beyond
expiration of the contract, he would have to purchase stock in the
corporation.43 The court rejected the plaintiffs contentions, finding that
the stock redemption did not effect a complete transfer of the corporation's
business, equipment or patient list'; and, furthermore, the defendant was

38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Cardiology

Assocs. of Southwestern Michigan, P.C. v. Zencka, M.D., 400 N.W.2d 606
(Mich. Ct App. 1985).
41 Id.
42

Id.

' Echoing Pittiman,the court noted additional supporting factors of the employer-employee
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, and the fact that the covenant-not-to-compete did not
apply to the two other cardiologists in the group, who were senior to the defendant. Id. at 606-6 10.
m Id.
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merely reselling that which he had initially purchased 45from the corporation
rather than a separate business interest or goodwill.
Finally, in Bosley Medical Group v. Abramnson, a hair replacement
clinic sued a former physician-employee, claiming he had breached a
covenant-not-to-compete in a stock purchase agreement he had entered
into with the clinic.' At the outset of his employment, the physician had
been given a stock purchase agreement, along with an independent
contractor's agreement. 47 He was advised that he would have to execute
both in order to practice with the group. 48 The stock purchase agreement
required that he buy nine shares of the clinic's stock, representing an
interest in the corporation of nine percent, at a price of ten thousand
dollars.49 Seventy-three percent of the corporation's stock was held by a
single individual who was the president and director."0 The agreement
required that the physician sell back the shares if he left the clinic"' and
contained an additional covenant under which the physician agreed not to
engage in a similar practice within certain counties for three years after
leaving the clinic. 2 When the physician left two years later and
immediately opened his own hair transplant practice nearby, the clinic
sought an injunction.5"
The Bosley court held that the non-compete covenant was void and
agreed with the physician that the stock purchase agreement he was
required to sign upon his employment was a sham devised to fit within an
exception of California law that prohibits agreements that restrict the
practice of a business or profession.54 Like the statute in Moore, the
California exception permits covenants only when the sale of a
shareholder's stock involves a substantial interest in the corporation such

41

Id. at 610.

" Bosley Med. Group v. Abramson, 161 Cal. App.3d 284,287 (2d Dist. 1984).
47 Id.
48 Id. at286.
49 Id. at287.
soId.
Si Id. at287.
52 Bosley Med. Group v. Abramson, 161 Cal. App.3d 284,287 (2d Dist. 1984)
53 Id.

4

Id. (concluding that "the provision contained in the stck purchaca agrecmcnt that

is void and unenforceable'),
Defendant will not compete ...

102
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that it constituted a transfer of goodwill. 5 The Bosley court concluded
that the agreement signed by the physician that required his purchase of
stock did not qualify under California law because it was not intended to
benefit the physician, since the stock represented only a limited interest in
the clinic from which he would not produce a reasonable return.5"
The Bosley court was also convinced of the sham nature of the stock
purchase simply because the agreement's stated purpose made little sense.
The agreement purported to provide the physician with "additional
incentive" to achieve a professional relationship between himself and the
clinic.57 The court dismissed this as pretextual since the clinic had told the
physician that his annual salary would be at least $200,000; and, thus, it
was questionable whether a mandatory purchase of $10,000 in stock would
create any additional incentive.58 Moreover, the "professional relationship"
sought by the clinic was already assured by the independent contractor
agreement that governed the parties' conduct.59
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR
THE PRACTITIONER
In light of the above discussion, parties involved in the formation of
integrated delivery systems, physician-hospital organizations and other
health care entities that require the purchase of practices and employment
of selling physicians, should be cautious in devising covenants-not-tocompete. A critical factor in enforcing covenants in these situations is the
bargaining power of the covenantor, as shown in Pittman and the other
cases analyzed in this article. An employer will have a more convincing
argument that broad restrictions should be enforced against a partner or
equity holder in the selling entity, while the argument will be less
persuasive with regard to mere employees or associate physicians of the
selling practice. Similarly, it may be argued that a shareholder-physician
s BosleyMed. Group, 161 Cal. App. 3dat287 (quoting CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE. § 16601

(West 1995)); Boulder Med. Ctr. v. Moore, 651 P.2d 464 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982)citing CoLO. REV.
STAT. § 2 (1973)).
56 BosleyMed. Group, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 290.
5 Id. at291.
S Bosley Med. Group v. Abramson, 161 Cal. App. 3d 284,291 (2d Dist 1984).
59 Id.
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in a large clinic has little bargaining power vis-a-vis the purchaser of a
clinic, since he or she is merely one of numerous equity holders with a

minor ownership interest. Physicians in such situations may be more
successful in arguing that the covenants-not-to-compete as applied against
them are enforceable only if they comply with requirements of employment
covenants.
In addition, the law of the local jurisdiction must be consulted to be
certain the restrictive terms (e.g., time, geography) are reasonable.'

Moreover, drafters should keep in mind that the stronger the argument that
the covenant is part of the sale of assets, the more likely the purchaser will
be able to enforce broader restrictions in the event physicians attempt to

leave once the transaction has been consummated.
To ensure that a covenant is ancillary to the sale of the practice, the

covenant should be included in the purchase documents. An additional
covenant still may be required in the employment agreement in order to
restrict physicians who leave once the covenant in the purchase documents
has expired."' For example, in the formation of a physician-hospital
organization through a hospital's acquisition of a clinic's assets, which clinic
remains in existence solely to function as the asset-less employer of the
physicians, broader covenants-not-to-compete could be included in the
asset purchase agreement between the hospital and clinic; on the

' The sale of a medical practice also must be structured so that it complies vath the Federal
Stark I, 42 U.S.C. §1395 (1996), and Ant-Kickback statutes, 42 US C. §1320a-7b:b) (1996),
Under these statutes, payment received for goodwill and other intangible ascets (the value ofv.hieh
a covenant-not-to-compete serves to protect) could be characterized as illegal comgenation or
remuneration. To reduce the risk ofviolating these patient referral statutes, a buyer should obtain
written opinions from qualified, independent appraisers that its acquisition is at fair market value and
document its due diligence review of practice operations, earnings history and balance sheet a:et,
Similarly, a buyer should document any competing offers for the acquired practice,
61
As with the purchase of the a medical practice, see supra note 60, cmp!oyment of a
physician must also be structured to comply with Stark H and Anti-kickback statutes For e.--mp!e,
the latter statute contains an exception to its prohibitions where a bona fide emp!oyment relation,:hip
exists, see 42 U.S.C.§ 1320a-7b(aX3) (1996); the regulations defining the term "emp!oyee"
uced
in this exceoption relies on the meaning used by the IRS, see 42 C.FR. §1001.952() (19961(citing
26 U.S.C. §3121(dX2) (1996)), and thus a W-2 employment relationship is required. Similarly, Stark
11 provides an exception for employment arrangements where (1) the emploment is for identifiab!e
services, (2) The remuneration is consistent %%ithfair market value for the cerices rendered and dees
not take into account the volume or value of referrals by the physician; (3) the agreement %vouldbe
commercially reasonable even in the absence of any referrals to the employer, and (4) the emp!oyent
meets the requirements of other applicable regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e).C2) (1596),
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otherhand, while the clinic could have narrower covenants in the
employment contracts. A potential problem with this approach is that a
court could conclude that the imposition of two different covenants against
an individual is improper and overreaching. The law of the local
jurisdiction should be reviewed to determine how to handle this issue.
Finally, in addition to covenants-not-to-compete, another method of
promoting continued physician employment after consummation of a deal
is through the use of a deferred purchase price or compensation
arrangement. An asset purchase agreement can provide that, besides the
purchase money paid at closing, a selling physician's interest in any
deferred purchase price will vest incrementally over time after the deal
closes. For example, the agreement could require that in order for a
physician's share of the deferred purchase price to vest fully, the physician
must remain employed by the new entity for a five year period.
CONCLUSION
At this point, a relatively small number of cases involving the hybrid
situation exists in which a medical practice is sold and the selling physician
becomes an employee of the buyer. However, from the cases reviewed
above, it is clear that in integrating physicians and their practices into larger
provider entities, parties must exercise caution in drafting covenants-notto-compete physicians within whom they contract. An important
consideration in determining the reasonableness of the covenant's terms
will be the bargaining power of the covenantor-physicians, as well as the
substance of the specific transaction in which the covenant is included.

